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CLOSING A LOOPHOLE: INSIDER TRADING
IN STANDARDIZED OPTIONS
Steve Thel*

A recent Note in the Journal took the position that section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' and rule 10b-

52 should be interpreted broadly-to close a loophole that may

allow corporate insiders to trade standardized options on the
corporation's stock when they cannot trade the stock itself.3
While it is generally agreed that insiders violate rule lOb-5 if
they trade stock on the basis of material nonpublic corporate
information, the Note suggested that the rule may not forbid

them to trade options on the stock under the same circumstances. 4 There are several theories why insider trading violates
rule lOb-5, 5 but the Note argued that by the simple expedient

of trading options on common stock rather than the common
stock itself, an insider can escape liability under the only theory
6

that the Supreme Court has expressly endorsed.
The key to insider trading law under rule lOb-5 is Chiarella
v. United States,7 in which the Supreme Court held that a

trader who does not make any misrepresentation does not violate
section 10(b) or rule 10b-5 unless his silent trading is deceptive
because he violates some duty when he trades.' Broadly speaking, there are two reasons that an insider in possession of

* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., University of
North Texas; J.D., Harvard University.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
3. Note, Insiders, Options and the Fiduciary Principle: A Rule 1Ob-5 Loophole,
16 FoRDHA" URB. L.J. 295 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Rule lOb-5 Loophole].
4. Id. at 322.
5. See generally D. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADnIG REGULAMTION (1988) [hereinafter
LANGEVOORT].

6. Note, Rule lOb-5 Loophole, supra note 3, at 324 & n.223 ("no criminal liability,
no civil penalties, and no private liability").
7. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
8. Id. at 227-28. The holding follows from the language of § 10(b), which provides
for the regulation of manipulative or deceptive devices and contrivances. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (1982).
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material nonpublic corporate information might be under a duty
not to trade. First, the insider and the other party to the
trade may be in a relationship that requires the insider to
disclose the information before trading (for example, when an
insider is buying from a shareholder of the corporation); second,
the insider's trades may constitute misuse or misappropriation
of corporate information.
As the Note showed, there is some confusion about the reason
an insider cannot trade. 9 The Note argued that it is critical
to identify the reason in cases in which insiders trade standardized options while in possession of material nonpublic corporate
information, because corporate insiders do not necessarily
owe candor to option traders who do not own securities issued
by the corporation. 0 If silent trading violates rule 10b-5 only
when the trader breaches a duty of candor owed directly to
the other party to the trade, insider trading in options will
not typically be illegal." On the other hand, if silent trading
violates the rule because the trader improperly uses privileged
information for private ends, then insider trading in options
is illegal.' 2 The Note took insider trading in options to be
unfair and unjust, and thus concluded that courts should adopt
a broad misappropriation theory and hold that insiders owe
the general public a duty to speak before trading. 3
Congress addressed the question of insider trading in options
in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984.14 The Note looked
to the Sanctions Act as a source of congressional policy on
insider trading, 5 but it did not fully develop the ramifications
of the Act. Along with its more famous civil penalty provision,' 6
7
the Sanctions Act added section 20(d) to the Exchange Act.1

9. See generally Note, Rule Job-5 Loophole, supra note 3. In Chiarella, the Court
accepted the proposition that corporate insiders have a fiduciary duty to disclose material
corporate information before buying common stock from ignorant shareholders. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 227-30. However, the Court declined to decide whether a trader's
misuse or misappropriation of confidential information alone could give rise to a
violation of § 10(b). See id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
10. See Note, Rule JOb-5 Loophole, supra note 3, at 328-29.
11. Id. at 324.
12. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).

13. See Note, Rule 10b-5 Loophole, supra note 3, at 328-29.
14. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 15

U.S.C.).
15. See Note, Rule lOb-5 Loophole, supra note 3, at 302-03.
16. Securities Exchange Act § 21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
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Section 20(d) declares that it is illegal to buy or sell options
while in possession of material nonpublic information if it would
be illegal to buy or sell the underlying security. I" If there was
a rule lOb-5 loophole, the Sanctions Act closed it. 19
It is often hard to say whether a particular case of insider
trading is illegal, 20 and there is an ongoing debate over whether
insider trading is even wrong. 2 1 The option problem highlights
these issues, and some answers are suggested by the way the
Note discussed the problem and by the way Congress addressed
it in the Sanctions Act. If insider trading is illegal or wrong
simply because insider traders violate duties they owe to corporate security holders, there is little reason to object to insider
trading in options. If insider trading in options is objectionable,
it may be because insider trading in general is objectionable
for some other reason. The Note condemned insider trading
in options because the author felt that it is simply unfair for
corporate insiders to trade while in possession of material nonpublic information. 22 The fact that Congress made insider trad-

18. Section 20(d) provides:
Wherever communicating, or purchasing or selling a security while in possession of, material nonpublic information would violate, or result in liability
to any purchaser or seller of the security under any provision of this chapter,
or any rule or regulation thereunder, such conduct in connection with a
purchase or sale of a put, call, straddle, option or privilege with respect to
such security or with respect to a group or index of securities including
such security, shall also violate and result in comparable liability to any
purchaser or seller of that security under such provision, rule or regulation.
Id.
19. See generally Crespi, Private Rights of Action for Option Position Holders
Under Section 20(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 21 (1988);
Wang, A Cause of Action for Option Traders Against Insider Option Traders, 101
HARv. L. REV. 1056 (1988); Note, Private Causes of Action for Option Investors
Under SEC Rule lOb-5: A Policy, Doctrinal, and Economic Analysis, 100 HARv. L.
REv. 1959 (1987); Note, Securities Regulation for a Changing Market: Option Trader
Standing Under Rule lOb-5, 97 YALE L.J. 623 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Standing].
20. The Note focused on trading by classic insiders, and thus did not address the
equally difficult issues of trading by tippees of insiders, and trading by persons who
possess material nonpublic information relevant to the value of a corporation's security
but who have no special relationship with the corporation.
21. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 5, at 7-16; Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic
Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom
Under SEC Rule lOb-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1217 (1981); cf. LANGEVOORT, supra
note 5, at 439-64 (legislative developments); Symposium: Defining 'Insider Trading',
39 ALA. L. REv. 337 (1988) (statutory definition).
22. See Note, Rule lOb-5 Loophole, supra note 3, at 328-29.
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ing in options illegal suggests that it may be of the same

mind .23

23. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 5, at 100-02; Langevoort, The Insider Trading
Sanctons Act of 1984 and its Effects on Existing Law, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1273, 128698 (1984); Note, Standing, supra note 19, at 639; cf Securities Exchange Act § 16(b),
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982) ("[flor the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information"); Securities Exchange Act § 20A, Pub. L. No. 100-704, sec. 5 (1988) (private
action), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADomN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 4677, 468081; H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-28, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & Arnmw. NEws 6043, 6063-65.

